16468/20
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FIFTH SECTION CASE OF KHOPTYAR AND OTHERS v. UKRAINE (Application no. 16468/20) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 9 July 2026 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Khoptyar and Others v. Ukraine, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: María Elósegui, President, Andreas Zünd, Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges, and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the application (no. 16468/20) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 18 March 2020 by the three Ukrainian nationals listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), who were represented by Ms Y.A. Segeda, a lawyer practising in Dnipro; the decision to give notice of the application to the Ukrainian Government (“the Government”), represented, most recently, by their Acting Agent, Mr Andrii Luksha; the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 18 June 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1. The application concerns the alleged failure by the domestic authorities to investigate the applicants’ complaints of ill‑treatment they had suffered at the hands of the first applicant’s partner, K. Relying on Articles 2, 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention, the applicants complained that the investigation into their ill‑treatment had been ineffective.
2. The first applicant is the mother of the second applicant. The second applicant – who was one year old at the time of the events – is the son of the first applicant and the grandson of the third applicant. The third applicant is the mother of the first applicant and the grandmother of the second applicant (see Appendix).
3. According to the first applicant, on 24 September 2016 at around 10 p.m., K. hit her on her lower lip and, at the same time, he also hit the second applicant on his cheek, as the first applicant had been holding the second applicant in her arms. The third applicant and Kh., the first applicant’s father, both witnessed the event. On 25 September 2016 at around 5 p.m. the third applicant witnessed another fight between the first applicant and K. and, in her attempt to break up the fight, she received injuries at the hands of K.
4. On 27 September 2016 a forensic medical doctor examined all three applicants on their own initiative, recorded their injuries, and classified them as minor. In particular, the first applicant sustained an abrasion on her face and bruises on her upper and lower limbs. The second applicant sustained a bruise on his face and a haematoma on the inside of his right cheek. The third applicant sustained bruises on her torso, on both upper limbs and on her right lower limb.
5. On 4 October 2016 all three applicants lodged criminal complaints with the Amur-Nyzhniodniprovskyi Branch of the Dniprovsk Police Department in the Dnipropetrovsk Region (“the police”) in respect of the beatings by K.
6. On 5 October 2016 the police opened criminal case no. 12016040630002968 (“the criminal case”) under Article 125 § 1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine into the infliction of minor bodily injuries on the second applicant by an unknown person.
7. On 18 October 2016 the police ordered a forensic medical examination of the second applicant’s injuries.
8. On 28 October 2016 a prosecutor from the Dnipropetrovsk Local Prosecutor’s Office No. 1 (“the prosecutor’s office”) instructed the police to take further procedural action.
9. On 1 November 2016 a forensic medical doctor classified the second applicant’s injuries as minor.
10. On 29 November 2016 the police questioned the first applicant as a victim and the third applicant as a witness.
11. On 15 March 2017 the criminal case was assigned to a new investigator A.K.
12. On 6 February 2018 the police ordered another forensic medical examination of the second applicant’s injuries and carried out an investigative experiment, involving the second applicant as a victim and the first applicant as his representative.
13. On 21 February 2018 a forensic doctor repeated the conclusions of the forensic medical report of 1 November 2018 and stated that the second applicant’s injuries could have been inflicted in the circumstances described by the first applicant.
14. On 17 April 2018 the prosecutor wrote to the head of the police, asking him to replace the investigator A.K. on account of his failure to take all necessary procedural action, as indicated in the instruction of 28 October 2016 (see paragraph 8 above). On the same day another instruction was sent to the police, detailing further procedural action to be taken and asking them to (i) question the first and the third applicants as victims; (ii) question Kh. as a witness; (iii) carry out an investigative experiment – involving the victims ‑ with the aim of identifying whether K. had hit the second applicant merely by accident; and (iv) carry out another medical forensic examination of the first and the third applicants’ injuries.
15. On 1 June 2018 the police questioned the first applicant as a victim, and the third applicant and Kh. as witnesses.
16. On 14 September 2018 the prosecutor’s office wrote to the police, ordering them to (i) carry out an investigative experiment, involving the first and third applicants; (ii) request a forensic medical examination of their injuries; (iii) establish the whereabouts of K.; and (iv) question K. in relation to the events of 24 September 2016.
17. On 9 March 2019 the police questioned the first applicant and Kh. as witnesses.
18. On 10 September 2019 the police closed the criminal case for lack of evidence.
19. On 30 October 2019 the first applicant appealed against the above‑mentioned decision to the prosecutor’s office.
20. On 5 November 2019 the prosecutor set aside the above‑mentioned decision to close the criminal case as premature and instructed the police to take further procedural action, such as to (i) establish the whereabouts of K.; (ii) carry out an investigative experiment, involving the first and third applicants; and (iii) order a forensic medical examination of their injuries.
21. On 28 December 2019 the first deputy head of the prosecutor’s office wrote to the applicant’s representative in reply to her complaint of 16 December 2019, informing her that the criminal case had been assigned to the investigator M. He acknowledged that the investigation had lasted an unreasonable length of time and stated that a letter in that connection had been sent to the police, asking them to carry out an internal investigation into the reasons why the investigation had been lengthy and ineffective and to hold accountable those individuals at fault.
22. On 28 May 2020 the police closed the proceedings for lack of evidence, as they could not identify the perpetrator.
23. On 24 June 2020 the prosecutor set aside the above‑mentioned decision.
24. On 30 September 2020 the police closed the criminal case for lack of evidence. The applicants claimed that the police had not sent them a copy of the above‑mentioned decision. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 25. The applicants complained under Articles 2, 3, 8 and 13 of the Convention that the State had failed to fulfil its positive obligations and had failed to investigate their complaints of ill‑treatment effectively and efficiently.
26. The Court, which is master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 114 and 126, 20 March 2018), will examine the above complaint under Article 8 of the Convention (see Ž.B. v. Croatia, no. 47666/13, § 47, 11 July 2017).
27. The Government submitted that the applicants had failed to exhaust domestic remedies – that is, they had not appealed against the decisions to close the criminal case and they had failed to complain to the domestic courts about the alleged lack of activity on the part of the police. In addition, the applicants could have lodged a civil claim against the State authorities, seeking compensation in respect of non‑pecuniary damage allegedly caused by the ineffective investigation into their injuries. Furthermore, they argued that the applicants’ injuries did not fall within the ambit of either Articles 3 or 8 of the Convention and asked the Court to dismiss their complaints as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. Lastly, the Government submitted in their comments in reply to the applicant’s observations that because the applicants had already “lost confidence in the investigation and engaged a lawyer” in August 2019, the six‑month time‑limit should have started running at that point in time. Since the application had been lodged only on 18 March 2020, they contended that it had therefore been submitted out of time. Accordingly, the present application should be rejected on those grounds.
28. The applicants maintained their complaints.
29. As to the objection ratione materiae, the Court reiterates that the concept of private life under Article 8 of the Convention covers a person’s physical and moral integrity and extends to the sphere of the relations between individuals themselves. There is no reason in principle why the notion of “private life” should exclude attacks on one’s physical integrity (see A. v. Croatia, no. 55164/08, §§ 58 and 60, 14 October 2010). However, in order for Article 8 to come into play, an attack on a person must attain a certain level of seriousness (see Špadijer v. Montenegro, no. 31549/18, § 81, 9 November 2021). In the present case, all three applicants sustained bodily injuries, which were recorded in the relevant medical forensic reports and were classified as minor injuries by a forensic doctor (see paragraph 4 above). The Court finds that the attacks in question were serious enough and clearly interfered with the applicants’ right to respect for their private lives. Accordingly, Article 8 of the Convention is applicable to the circumstances of the case at hand.
30. With regard to the non‑exhaustion objection, the Court notes that it has already dismissed similar objections by the Government in cases involving complaints of ineffective investigations into ill‑treatment or domestic violence (see M.A. v. Iceland, no. 59813/19, § 43, 26 August 2025, with further references). It sees no reason to depart from that approach in the present case, and thus dismisses the Government’s non‑exhaustion objection.
31. In relation to the Government’s six‑month rule objection, the Court notes that the final decision of the police to close the criminal case was given on 30 September 2020 – that is, the date from which the six‑month time‑limit started to run. The applicants lodged their application with the Court on 18 March 2020, thus complying with that time‑limit. The Government’s submission that the relevant time‑limit started to run in August 2019 lacks merit, as at that time the investigation was ongoing. The Court therefore dismisses that objection.
32. The Court further notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
33. The general principles concerning investigations into domestic violence have been summarised in M.A. v. Iceland (no. 59813/19, §§ 56-61, 26 August 2025).
34. The Court observes that the police opened the criminal case into the incident the day after the day on which the applicants lodged their criminal complaints. However, the criminal case was opened only to investigate the injuries sustained by the second applicant, whereas the complaints of the first and the third applicants concerning their own injuries were either not properly examined or disregarded altogether. The police twice questioned the first applicant as a victim – that is, in 2016 and in 2018 (see paragraphs 10 and 15 above), but in 2019 they questioned her as a witness (see paragraph 17 above).The third applicant was never questioned as a victim, despite the fact that her injuries were also recorded in the medical forensic report (see paragraph 4 above). The criminal investigation into the second applicant’s complaints of ill‑treatment lacked the necessary thoroughness and seriousness. This is evident from the decisions to reassign the case to a new investigator for lack of action (see paragraphs 11, 14 and 21 above), the numerous letters from the prosecutor’s office to the police, instructing them to take further procedural action (see paragraphs 8, 16 and 20 above), and the letters from the prosecutor’s office to the applicants’ representative, acknowledging that the investigation had been ineffective (see paragraph 21 above).
35. In these circumstances, the Court has no option but to abide by the conclusions of the prosecutor’s office and to find that the criminal investigation into the complaints of ill‑treatment of all three applicants had been ineffective.
36. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. REMAINING COMPLAINT 37. The applicants also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings had been excessively long and that, for that reason, they had been prevented from lodging a civil claim for damages.
38. The Court notes that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil limb is applicable to criminal proceedings from the moment applicants have joined them as civil parties (see Molchanova v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 4465/18, § 28, 26 September 2023). In the present case, having examined all the material before it, the Court considers that in the absence of any civil claim lodged by the applicants, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is not applicable to such proceedings in their respect (see Skorokhodov v. Ukraine, no. 56697/09, § 42, 14 November 2013).
39. It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 40. The applicants claimed 24,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage and EUR 4,000 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
41. The Government submitted that the applicants’ claim was excessive and unsubstantiated.
42. The Court, making its award on an equitable basis, awards the applicants jointly EUR 4,500 in respect of non-pecuniary damage. Moreover, having regard to the documents in its possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 2,000 covering costs and expenses in the proceedings before the Court, plus any tax that may be chargeable to them, to be paid directly to the applicants’ representative, Ms Y.A. Segeda. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Declares the complaint concerning the lack of an effective investigation into the alleged ill‑treatment admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention; Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicants jointly, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: EUR 4,500 (four thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non‑pecuniary damage; EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicants, in respect of costs and expenses to be paid into the bank account of Ms Y.A. Segeda, as indicated by the applicants; that from the expiry of the above‑mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 July 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Martina Keller María Elósegui Deputy Registrar President APPENDIX List of applicants Application no. 16468/20 No. Applicant’s name Year of birth Nationality Place of residence 1. Vladyslava Stanislavivna KHOPTYAR 1980 Ukrainian Dnipro 2. Oleksandr Pavlovych KHOPTYAR 2015 Ukrainian Dnipro 3. Nina Ivanivna KHOPTYAR 1950 Ukrainian Bulakhivka
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