22738/20;35558/20

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SECOND SECTION CASE OF JOVANOV v. NORTH MACEDONIA (Applications nos. 22738/20 and 35558/20) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 7 July 2026 This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Jovanov v. North Macedonia, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of: Péter Paczolay, President, Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, Hugh Mercer, judges, and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to: the applications (nos. 22738/20 and 35558/20) against the Republic of North Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 9 June 2020 and 7 August 2020 respectively by the applicant, a Macedonian/citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia, who was born in 1968 and lives in Skopje, and was represented by Mr A. Godjo, a lawyer practising in Ohrid; the decision to give notice of the complaints, under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, concerning the alleged lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for the applicant’s continuous deprivation of liberty and an alleged lack of speedy review of the decisions extending it, to the Government of North Macedonia (“the Government”) represented by their Agent, Ms D. Djonova, and to declare the remainder of the applications inadmissible; the withdrawal of Mr Jovan Ilievski, the judge elected in respect of North Macedonia, from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3 of the Rules of Court); the parties’ observations; Having deliberated in private on 16 June 2026, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE 1.  The application concerns allegedly insufficient reasoning in the courts’ decisions extending the applicant’s house arrest in relation to criminal proceedings against him for abuse of office, and an alleged lack of a speedy review of those decisions by the Skopje Court of Appeal (“the appellate court”).

2. On 27 June 2019 a public prosecutor opened an investigation into abuse of office in respect of the applicant (a manager of a private company and a former government official) in the context of the criminal proceedings described in Janakieski v. North Macedonia (nos. 57325/19 and 16291/20, § 11, 14 November 2023) and requested that the applicant be detained in prison.

3. On 28 June 2019 a pre-trial judge ordered the applicant’s detention in a prison facility, which was twice extended. On 3 September 2019 the pre‑trial judge of the Skopje Criminal Court of First Instance (“the trial court”) replaced that detention by house arrest, and ordered that the applicant’s passport be seized. The applicant’s house arrest was subsequently extended three times by a three-judge panel of the appellate court, on the grounds that he might abscond or interfere with the investigation. After the applicant had been indicted on 12 December 2019, the applicant’s house arrest was extended by the three-judge panel of the trial court (“the panel”), solely on the ground of the risk of his absconding, eight times within the relevant period, including by decisions of 12 December 2019 and 10 January, 10 February, 11 March, 7 April, 7 May, and 9 June 2020. In its decisions, the panel referred to the stage of the proceedings, type, character and nature of the offence, the degree of criminal liability, the type and severity of the sentence prescribed and the possibility that a prison sentence might be imposed.

4. In the meantime, on 23 December 2019 the Supreme Court amended the extension order (concerning the applicant’s house arrest from 25 November until 25 December 2019), finding that the house arrest was justified on the grounds of the risk of his absconding. It further found that the applicant might use his connections made as a former government official and a manager of a private company to flee.

5. The applicant appealed against all extension orders. It took the appellate court from 18 to 39 days to decide on the appeals against the extension orders specified in paragraph 3 above. In addition to the reasons set out in the extension orders (see paragraph 3 above), in some of its decisions, the appellate court also referred to the “high degree of unlawfulness” of the actions for which the applicant was accused and to the pecuniary damage which the offence had allegedly caused to the budget as a reason justifying the risk that the applicant might abscond.

6. On 27 August 2020 the applicant’s house arrest was replaced with a prohibition to leave his place of residence, obligation to report weekly to the court, temporary seizure of his passport, prohibition to be issued a new passport and prohibition to cross the State borders with an identity card.

7. The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention about a lack of relevant and sufficient reasons for his deprivation of liberty in the period from 25 September 2019 until 7 August 2020 (the date of the lodging of his second application) and under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention of a lack of speedy review of the decisions extending his house arrest specified in paragraph 3 above. THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS 8.  Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single judgment. ALLEGED VIOLATIONs OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION Admissibility 9.  For the same reasons as those set out in Janakieski v. North Macedonia (nos. 57325/19 and 16291/20, §§ 57-61 and 63-65, 14 November 2023), the Court rejects the Government’s argument that a compensation claim under section 553 of the Criminal Proceedings Act and/or sections 9-a and 189 of the Obligations Act was an effective remedy for the purposes of the applicant’s complaints.

10. Furthermore, the applicant’s complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor are they inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. Merits Article 5 § 3 of the Convention 11.  The general principles relevant for assessing the justification for a person’s deprivation of liberty have been summarised in Radonjić and Romić v. Serbia (no. 43674/16, §§ 64-70, 4 April 2023). Тhe Court applies the same criteria for the entire period of deprivation of liberty, irrespective of the place where the applicant was detained (see Janakieski, cited above, § 69).

12. In the present case the applicant was detained on 28 June 2019 (see paragraph 3 above). His house arrest ended on 27 August 2020 (see paragraph 6 above). However, the applicant specifically complained about his house arrest in the period from 25 September 2019 until 7 August 2020 (see paragraph 7 above).

13. The Court observes that after the applicant was indicted (see paragraph 3 above) and until 7 August 2020, his house arrest was justified solely on the basis of the risk of his absconding. In establishing this risk, the domestic courts referred to the “type, character and nature of the offence, the degree of criminal liability, the type and severity of the sentence prescribed”, the possibility that a prison sentence might be imposed, the “high degree of unlawfulness” of the actions for which the applicant was accused, the phase of the proceedings and the pecuniary damage which the offence had allegedly caused to the budget (see paragraphs 3 and 5 above). Only the Supreme Court, with its decision of 23 December 2019, concerning the applicant’s house arrest from 25 November until 25 December 2019, referred to the applicant’s personal circumstances when mentioning that he might use his connections gained as a former government official and a manager of a private company to flee (see paragraph 4 above). In all the remaining decisions (covering a period of at least seven months), the reasoning of the domestic courts remained identical and repetitive with summary wording that does not suggest that they engaged in a substantive analysis of the applicant’s personal circumstances (see paragraph 3 above). Furthermore, they did not include an appropriate assessment of the continued justification for the applicant’s house arrest despite the passage of time (compare Janakieski, cited above, § 79).

14. The Government submitted that more lenient measures, such as merely seizing the applicant’s passport, could not have sufficed because the applicant might have used his connections to hide within the respondent State or to escape to the neighbouring countries, as the borders were frequently crossed at the relevant time with only a national identification document. The Court notes, however, that these reasons were never relied on by the domestic courts in the relevant decisions and accordingly cannot be taken into account (compare, mutatis mutandis, Ramkovski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 33566/11, § 61, 8 February 2018).

15. These considerations are sufficient for the Court to conclude that the reasons given for the applicant’s deprivation of liberty, at least following the decision of 23 December 2019, although “relevant”, were not “sufficient”. It is therefore not necessary to assess separately the period preceding that decision (compare Janakieski, cited above, § 83, and Vasilkoski and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 28169/08, § 64, 28 October 2010).

16. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article 5 § 4 of the Convention 17.  The applicable general principles concerning the speedy review of the lawfulness of detention are set out in Ilnseher v. Germany ([GC] nos. 10211/12 and 27505/14, §§ 251-56, 4 December 2018).

18. In the present case the review proceedings in respect of the impugned extension orders lasted between 18 and 39 days (see paragraph 5 above). The Court has previously found such delays to be excessive (see Janakieski, cited above, § 89 in fine, and the cases cited therein). For the reasons set out in Janakieski (ibid., §§ 91-94) the Court cannot accept the Government’s arguments that there had been a fresh judicial assessment of the applicant’s house arrest at first instance while his appeals against the orders extending his house arrest had been pending, that the applicant’s appeals were communicated to the public prosecutor for a reply, that the second-instance court had held hearings which had prolonged the decision-making process, that the applicant had lodged more than one appeal against certain orders, that the case was complex or that the COVID-19 pandemic had prolonged the decision-making process of the appeal court.

19. In conclusion, the domestic courts failed to comply with the requirement of speediness enshrined in Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. There has, accordingly, been a violation of that provision. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 20.  The applicant claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 7,483 in respect of costs and expenses incurred before the Court.

21. The Government contested the amounts as excessive and unsubstantiated.

22. The Court considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 3,900 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

23. The Court also considers it reasonable to award the applicant EUR 1,250 for costs and expenses in the proceedings before it, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, Decides to join the applications; Declares the applications admissible; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention; Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention; Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into the national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement: EUR 3,900 (three thousand nine hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; EUR 1,250 (one thousand two hundred and fifty euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points; Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 July 2026, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Dorothee von Arnim Péter Paczolay Deputy Registrar President